







is	 that	 there	 is	 an	 important	 distinction	 to	 be	 drawn	 between	 substantive	 and	
structural	requirements	of	rationality	(Scanlon	2007;	Worsnip	2018a).	The	goal	of	




a	 reason	 for	 something	 as	 “a	 consideration	 that	 counts	 in	 favor	 of	 it”	 (1998:	 17).	
Given	the	flexibility	of	the	English	word	‘reason’,	however,	there	is	no	single	sense	
in	which	reasons	count	 in	 favor	of	belief	or	action	(Schroeder	2008).	For	current	
purposes,	 a	 reason	 to	ϕ	 counts	 in	 favor	 of	ϕ-ing	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 contributes	
towards	 making	 it	 substantively	 rational	 to	 ϕ.	 According	 to	 evidentialism	 in	
epistemology,	 all	 reasons	 for	 belief	 are	 constituted	 by	 evidence.	 Given	 this	
assumption,	 substantive	 rationality	 in	 the	 epistemic	 domain	 is	 a	 matter	 of	
proportioning	your	beliefs	to	your	evidence.	
Structural	 rationality,	 in	 contrast,	 is	 a	matter	 of	 having	 beliefs	 and	 other	
attitudes	 that	 cohere	 or	 “fit	 together”	 in	 the	 right	 way.	 Although	 there	 is	 some	
controversy	about	which	forms	of	coherence	are	required	for	structural	rationality,	
the	 following	 requirements	 are	 widely	 endorsed.	 First,	 your	 beliefs	 should	 be	
logically	 coherent	 in	the	sense	that	they	are	logically	consistent	and	closed	under	
logical	 consequence.	 Second,	 your	 degrees	 of	 belief	 or	 “credences”	 should	 be	
probabilistically	 coherent	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 conform	 to	 the	 axioms	 of	 the	
probability	calculus.	And	third,	your	beliefs	should	be	meta-coherent	in	the	sense	
that	 your	 object-level	 beliefs	 cohere	 with	 your	 meta-level	 beliefs	 about	 which	
beliefs	you	should	hold.	
It	 is	 plausible	 that	 both	 substantive	 and	 structural	 requirements	 are	 built	
into	 our	 ordinary	 conception	 of	 epistemic	 rationality.	 An	 epistemically	 rational	
agent	 is	 one	whose	 beliefs	 are	 both	 coherent	 and	 proportioned	 to	 her	 evidence.	
Anyone	whose	beliefs	 are	 either	 incoherent	 or	 unsupported	by	her	 evidence	has	
thereby	violated	some	requirement	of	epistemic	rationality.	
Some	 theories	of	 epistemic	 rationality	 impose	no	 substantive	 requirement	
to	 respect	 your	 evidence,	but	 these	 theories	have	 little	 to	 recommend	 them.	On	
pure	versions	of	coherentism,	for	example,	epistemic	rationality	is	simply	a	matter	
of	 having	 beliefs	 that	 cohere	 with	 each	 other.	 Similarly,	 according	 to	 subjective	
Bayesianism,	there	is	nothing	more	to	epistemic	rationality	than	having	credences	
that	 are	 probabilistically	 coherent	 and	 updated	 by	 Bayesian	 conditionalization.	
These	views	are	subject	to	compelling	counterexamples.	Consider	Magic	Feldman,	





Other	 theories	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 abandon	 any	 structural	
requirements	of	coherence.	On	a	global	version	of	phenomenal	conservatism,	for	
example,	epistemic	rationality	is	simply	a	matter	of	believing	whatever	seems	true	




distinctive	 of	 epistemically	 rationally	 agents.	 Any	 conception	 of	 epistemic	
rationality	 that	 deserves	 the	 name	 must	 recognize	 at	 least	 some	 structural	
requirements	of	coherence.	
This	 chapter	 begins	 from	 the	 plausible	 assumption	 that	 epistemic	
rationality	requires	both	coherence	and	respecting	your	evidence.	The	main	goal	of	








requirements	 can	 come	 into	 conflict	 when	 your	 evidence	 supports	 incoherent	
beliefs.	 Thus,	 Alex	 Worsnip	 (2018a)	 argues	 that	 your	 evidence	 supports	 meta-
incoherent	 beliefs	 when	 it	 is	 misleading	 about	 itself.	 Such	 cases	 threaten	 to	
generate	 epistemic	 dilemmas	 in	 which	 you	 are	 guaranteed	 to	 violate	 either	 the	
substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence	or	the	structural	requirement	of	
meta-coherence.	
The	central	 thesis	of	 this	chapter	 is	 that	 there	can	be	no	conflict	between	
evidence	 and	 coherence.	 This	 is	 because	 there	 are	 structural	 constraints	 on	 the	
evidential	 support	 relation,	 which	 guarantee	 that	 your	 evidence	 never	 supports	
incoherent	beliefs.	Any	epistemically	 rational	agent	who	 respects	her	evidence	 is	
thereby	 guaranteed	 to	be	 coherent,	 since	 the	 evidence	 always	 supports	 coherent	
beliefs.	According	to	this	version	of	unificationism,	there	is	fundamentally	just	one	
requirement	 of	 epistemic	 rationality,	 which	 incorporates	 both	 substantive	 and	
structural	 dimensions.	 This	 is	 the	 evidentialist	 requirement	 to	 hold	 beliefs	 that	





they	 are	 certain	 given	 your	 evidence.	 On	 this	 view,	 respecting	 your	 evidence	
guarantees	 that	 your	 beliefs	 are	 not	 only	 coherent,	 but	 also	 meta-coherent.	
	 3	
Moreover,	 I	explain	away	 intuitions	 to	 the	contrary	by	appealing	 to	a	distinction	
between	ideal	and	non-ideal	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	
Here	 is	 the	 plan.	 §1	 presents	 a	 puzzle	 that	 arises	 from	 the	 bifurcationist	
assumption	 that	 there	 can	 be	 conflicts	 between	 evidence	 and	 coherence.	 §2	
critiques	 various	 bifurcationist	 solutions	 to	 the	 puzzle,	 while	 §3	 raises	 more	
general	problems	with	the	bifurcationist	assumption	that	generates	the	puzzle	 in	
the	 first	 place.	 §4	 presents	 my	 unificationist	 solution	 to	 the	 puzzle,	 while	 §5	







cases	 in	which	 the	 substantive	 requirement	 to	 respect	 your	 evidence	 appears	 to	
conflict	 with	 the	 structural	 requirement	 to	 be	 coherent	 because	 your	 evidence	
supports	 incoherent	 beliefs.	 Such	 cases	 threaten	 to	 yield	 epistemic	 dilemmas	 in	
which	epistemic	 rationality	 issues	 logically	 inconsistent	 requirements,	but	 this	 is	












a	 requirement	 of	 epistemic	 rationality,	 since	 you	 cannot	 respect	 your	 evidence	
while	 also	 remaining	 coherent.	 In	 such	 cases,	 you	 face	 an	 epistemic	 dilemma	 in	
which	epistemic	rationality	issues	inconsistent	requirements.	
Worsnip	 (2018a)	 explores	 a	 version	 of	 this	 puzzle	 that	 is	 generated	 by	
higher-order	 evidence:	 that	 is,	evidence	about	your	own	evidence.	The	key	 idea	 is	
that	when	you	have	misleading	higher-order	evidence,	your	total	evidence	can	be	
misleading	 about	 itself.	 For	 example,	 your	 total	 evidence	 can	 support	 the	








consistent	 and	 yet	 it	 nevertheless	 seems	 epistemically	 irrational	 to	 believe	 it	
(Smithies	 2012;	 Horowitz	 2014).	 Someone	 who	 believes	 the	 conjuncts	 of	 this	
conjunction	is	epistemically	akratic	in	a	way	that	seems	irrational.	Just	as	it	seems	
irrational	to	act	in	conflict	with	your	beliefs	about	how	you	should	act,	so	it	seems	
irrational	 to	 hold	 beliefs	 that	 conflict	 with	 your	 beliefs	 about	 what	 you	 should	
believe.	 Akrasia,	 whether	 practical	 or	 epistemic,	 is	 a	 paradigmatic	 form	 of	
structural	 irrationality.	 Nevertheless,	 Worsnip	 argues,	 your	 evidence	 makes	 it	







her.	 Miss	 Marple	 and	 Mabel	 set	 about	 the	 mansion	 collecting	 clues.	
Unfortunately,	 in	 their	 initial	 sweep	of	 the	house,	nothing	 that	 they	 learn	
offers	 any	 kind	 of	 significant	 support	 to	 any	 particular	 hypothesis	 about	
who	 committed	 the	 crime.	 As	 part	 of	 her	 training	 of	 Mabel	 as	 her	
apprentice,	after	they	have	finished	examining	a	crime	scene,	Miss	Marple	
always	 tells	 Mabel	 what	 [is]	 her	 own	 assessment	 of	 what	 the	 evidence	






Worsnip,	Mabel’s	 total	evidence	supports	agnosticism	about	whether	 the	vicar	 is	






David	 Christensen	 (2007)	 gives	 similar	 examples	 in	 which	 you	 have	
misleading	evidence	about	your	own	logical	reasoning	abilities:	
	
Reason-Distorting	 Drugs.	 Suppose	 that	 I	 work	 out	my	 proof	 of	 T	 after	
having	 coffee	with	my	 friend	 Jocko.	 Palms	 sweaty	with	 the	 excitement	 of	
logical	progress,	I	check	my	work	several	times,	and	decide	that	the	proof	is	
good.	But	then	a	trusted	colleague	walks	in	and	tells	me	that	Jocko	has	been	








Christensen	 argues	 that	 it’s	 irrational	 to	 be	 certain	 that	 T	 while	 doubting	 the	

















epistemic	 dilemma	 in	 which	 you	 are	 guaranteed	 to	 violate	 a	 requirement	 of	
epistemic	rationality.	
Some	epistemologists	deny	 that	meta-coherence	 is	a	genuine	 requirement	
of	epistemic	rationality	(Coates	2012;	Weatherson	2019;	Lasonen-Aarnio	2020).	And	
yet	 this	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 dissolve	 the	 puzzle.	 We	 can	 generate	 puzzle	 cases	
through	 apparent	 conflicts	 between	 LOGIC	 and	 EVIDENCE	 without	 invoking	
INTEGRATION.	In	the	simplest	cases,	you	receive	expert	testimony	that	T	is	false,	
when	in	fact	T	is	a	logical	truth.	In	such	cases,	you	need	not	have	any	misleading	
higher-order	 evidence	 about	 your	 own	 reasoning	 abilities.	 Even	 so,	 it	 seems	
plausible	that	the	expert	testimony	gives	you	misleading	evidence	about	logic.	But	
you	cannot	respect	this	evidence	without	violating	probabilistic	coherence.	
Some	 epistemologists	 deny	 that	 probabilistic	 coherence	 is	 a	 genuine	
requirement	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 (Weatherson	 2019).	 But	 this	 is	 still	 not	
enough	to	dissolve	 the	puzzle,	 since	we	can	generate	apparent	conflicts	between	
evidence	and	coherence	without	making	any	assumptions	about	the	exact	form	of	
these	 coherence	 requirements.	 Whichever	 beliefs	 are	 prohibited	 by	 these	
coherence	requirements,	we	can	imagine	receiving	expert	testimony	that	provides	
misleading	 evidence	 that	 those	 beliefs	 are	 true.	 Hence,	 we	 cannot	 dissolve	 the	






of	 the	main	 arguments	 for	 bifurcationism	 is	 that	 the	 structural	 and	 substantive	
requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	are	distinct	because	they	conflict	when	your	
evidence	 supports	 incoherent	 beliefs.	 Hence,	 proponents	 of	 bifurcationism	





The	 first	 strategy	 is	 to	 reject	 claim	 (4)	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	 never	 issues	
inconsistent	 requirements	 (Hughes	 2019).	 On	 this	 view,	 epistemic	 rationality	
always	requires	respecting	your	evidence,	and	always	requires	coherence,	although	
























Suppose	 there	 are	 strict	 dilemmas	 in	 which	 I	 ought	 to	ϕ	 and	 I	 ought	 not	 to	ϕ.	
Given	 the	 agglomeration	 principle,	 I	 ought	 both	 to	ϕ	 and	 to	 refrain	 from	ϕ-ing.	
Given	the	ought-implies-can	principle,	it	follows	that	I	can	both	ϕ	and	refrain	from	
ϕ-ing.	 And	 yet	 I	 cannot	 both	 ϕ	 and	 refrain	 from	 ϕ-ing,	 since	 this	 is	 logically	
impossible.	Once	again,	we	derive	a	logical	contradiction.	
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Hughes	 (2019)	 defends	 the	 coherence	 of	 dilemmas	 by	 rejecting	 the	
agglomeration	 principle	 and	 the	 ought-implies-may	 principle.	 And	 yet	 rejecting	
these	 principles	 comes	 with	 a	 significant	 theoretical	 cost	 in	 simplicity	 or	
explanatory	power.	Either	we	cannot	explain	the	correctness	of	patterns	of	deontic	







rational	 is	 to	satisfy	all	 the	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	But	 if	 there	are	
strict	 dilemmas	 in	 which	 epistemic	 rationality	 issues	 inconsistent	 requirements,	
then	 it	 is	 logically	 impossible	 to	satisfy	all	of	 them	at	once.	And	there	can	be	no	
value	in	satisfying	all	the	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	when	it	is	logically	




rationality	 is	 valuable	 only	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 logically	 possible	 to	 achieve	 it.	 Rather	
than	compromising	the	value	of	epistemic	rationality,	however,	it	seems	preferable	
to	maintain	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	 is	 always	 valuable	 by	 denying	 that	 it	 ever	
issues	 logically	 inconsistent	 requirements.	Arguably,	 it	 is	 an	 adequacy	 constraint	





The	 second	 option	 is	 to	 treat	 the	 structural	 and	 substantive	 requirements	 of	
epistemic	 rationality	 as	 mere	 prima	 facie	 requirements	 to	 maximize	 various	
rational	 ideals,	 which	 can	 come	 into	 conflict	 (Christensen	 2007).	 On	 this	 view,	
there	can	be	conflicts	between	the	rational	ideals	of	coherence	and	respecting	your	







On	 this	 view,	 conflicts	 between	 rational	 ideals	 do	 not	 generate	 strict	
dilemmas	 in	which	you’re	 required	both	 to	believe	and	 to	 refrain	 from	believing	
one	and	 the	 same	proposition.	At	best,	 these	 conflicts	 generate	dilemmas	 in	 the	
colloquial	sense:	that	is,	hard	cases	in	which	it’s	not	obvious	how	you	should	weigh	
conflicting	 values	 against	 each	 other.	 And	 yet	 some	 conflicts	may	 generate	 easy	
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cases	 in	 which	 it	 seems	 clear	 how	 they	 should	 be	 resolved.	 For	 example,	
Christensen	claims	that	it’s	not	rationally	optimal	to	be	probabilistically	coherent	
in	the	face	of	higher-order	evidence	of	your	own	cognitive	 imperfection.	 Instead,	
you	should	reduce	your	confidence	 in	 logical	 truths	when	you	have	higher-order	
evidence	that	your	logical	reasoning	is	impaired	–	say,	by	reason-distorting	drugs.	
In	 such	cases,	 the	value	of	probabilistic	coherence	 is	outweighed	by	 the	value	of	
respecting	the	evidence	about	your	cognitive	abilities.	
How	 does	 this	 view	 solve	 the	 puzzle?	On	 this	 view,	 (2)	 and	 (3)	 are	 false	
because	epistemic	rationality	doesn’t	always	require	respecting	your	evidence	and	
also	 remaining	 coherent.	 When	 your	 evidence	 supports	 incoherent	 beliefs,	 it’s	
permissible	 to	 weigh	 these	 competing	 ideals	 against	 each	 other.	 Epistemic	
rationality	 requires	 only	 that	 your	 beliefs	 reflect	 some	 optimal	 balance	 between	
coherence	and	respecting	the	evidence.	
This	view	gives	a	more	plausible	treatment	of	hard	cases	than	treating	them	
as	 strict	 dilemmas.	 Consider	 Sartre’s	 (1946)	 example	 of	 the	 student	 deciding	
whether	to	join	the	French	resistance	to	the	German	occupation	or	instead	to	stay	
at	home	with	his	mother	who	depends	on	him.	It	seems	absurd	to	suggest	that	he	
should	do	both	 things	when	 this	 is	clearly	 impossible.	 It	 is	vastly	more	plausible	
that	he	should	pursue	whichever	course	of	action	is	supported	by	stronger	reasons,	





action,	 which	 derive	 from	 competing	 considerations	 about	 the	 value	 of	 helping	
your	 family	versus	 the	value	of	defending	your	nation.	What	you	ought	 to	do	 in	
such	cases	depends	on	the	overall	balance	of	substantive	reasons.	Our	examples,	in	
contrast,	do	not	 concern	conflicts	between	 substantive	 reasons,	but	between	 the	
substantive	 requirement	 to	 respect	 your	 reasons	 for	 belief	 and	 the	 structural	






after	 all.	 But	 if	 so,	 the	 substantive	 reasons	 for	 belief	 provided	 by	 your	 evidence	
must	be	weighed	against	the	substantive	reasons	for	belief	provided	by	structural	
considerations	about	coherence.	And	this	is	to	reject	the	evidentialist	assumption	
that	 all	 substantive	 reasons	 for	 belief	 are	 provided	 by	 evidence	 alone.	





The	 third	 option	 is	 that	 it’s	 indeterminate	 what	 you	 should	 believe	 when	
substantive	and	structural	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	come	into	conflict	
(Leonard	 2020).	On	 this	 view,	 conflicts	 between	 evidence	 and	 coherence	 do	not	
generate	epistemic	dilemmas	in	which	it’s	determinately	true	that	you	ought	and	







in	 what	 they	 require.	 Some	 resolutions	 require	 coherence,	 while	 others	 require	
respecting	 your	 evidence,	 although	 none	 require	 both.	 Hence,	 there	 are	 no	
epistemic	dilemmas,	since	it	is	determinately	false	that	you	ought	both	to	respect	
your	evidence	and	to	be	coherent	in	such	cases.	
How	does	 this	 view	 solve	 our	puzzle?	On	 this	 view,	neither	 (2)	nor	 (3)	 is	
determinately	 true,	 since	 it’s	 not	 determinately	 true	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	
requires	you	to	respect	your	evidence,	or	that	it	requires	you	to	be	coherent,	when	
your	 evidence	 supports	 incoherent	 beliefs.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it’s	 indeterminate	





epistemology	 are	 immune	 from	 indeterminacy.	 Arguably,	 though,	 this	 solution	
countenances	 too	 much	 normative	 indeterminacy,	 since	 it	 implies	 that	 the	
normative	 facts	 are	 indeterminate	 whenever	 conflicts	 arise	 between	 substantive	
and	 structural	 requirements	 of	 rationality.	Hence,	 this	 solution	 cannot	 vindicate	
intuitive	verdicts	about	what	we	should	believe	and	do	in	such	cases.	
Consider	 a	 pilot	 who	 has	 misleading	 evidence	 that	 she	 is	 suffering	 from	
hypoxia,	 but	 who	 calculates	 correctly	 that	 she	 has	 enough	 fuel	 to	 take	 a	 scenic	
detour	 en	 route	 to	 her	 final	 destination	 (Elga	 2013).	 Although	 her	 evidence	
supports	this	conclusion,	 it	seems	reckless	 for	her	to	decide	on	this	basis	 to	take	
the	detour,	 rather	 than	 flying	directly	 to	her	 destination,	 given	 the	higher-order	
evidence	 that	 she	 is	 cognitively	 impaired	 by	 hypoxia.	 Intuitively,	 she	 shouldn’t	
believe	or	act	on	the	conclusion	that	is	supported	by	her	evidence.	On	the	current	
proposal,	however,	it	is	indeterminate	whether	she	should	disrespect	her	evidence	
in	 this	way	or	 instead	violate	meta-coherence	by	believing	a	 conclusion	 that	 she	
regards	 as	 probably	 based	 on	 mistaken	 reasoning.	 Many	 will	 regard	 this	 as	 a	
counterintuitive	prediction	of	the	theory.	
Another	 problem	 is	 that	 this	 solution	 cannot	 vindicate	 the	 plausible	
theoretical	 principle	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	 always	 requires	 respecting	 your	




when	they	conflict,	since	 it	 implies	 that	 it’s	 indeterminate	which	one	you	should	
comply	 with.	 Worse,	 it	 implies	 that	 it’s	 determinately	 true	 that	 you	 shouldn’t	







respect	 your	 evidence	 and	 to	 remain	 coherent	 when	 your	 evidence	 supports	
incoherent	 beliefs	 (Worsnip	 2018a).	 On	 this	 view,	 these	 cases	 involve	 conflicts	
between	normative	 domains,	 rather	 than	within	 a	 single	 normative	 domain.	We	
cannot	 understand	 the	 distinction	 between	 substantive	 and	 structural	
requirements	in	terms	of	a	single	normative	concept	of	epistemic	rationality	that	
governs	what	we	should	believe.	Instead,	our	beliefs	are	governed	by	two	distinct	
and	 fundamentally	 different	 kinds	 of	 normative	 requirements	 that	 cannot	 be	
stated	using	the	same	normative	concept.	
How	 does	 this	 view	 solve	 our	 puzzle?	On	 this	 view,	 the	 appearance	 of	 a	








these	 requirements	 are	 fundamentally	 distinct,	 there	 is	 no	 danger	 of	
compromising	 evidentialism	 as	 a	 thesis	 about	 substantive	 reasons	 for	 belief	 by	
encroachment	 from	non-evidential	 considerations	 about	 coherence.	And,	 finally,	
since	 these	 requirements	 are	 incommensurable,	 there	 is	 no	 commitment	 to	 any	
common	scale	on	which	they	can	be	weighed	against	each	other.	
Despite	these	attractions,	however,	problems	remain.	One	problem	is	that	




meta-coherence,	 rather	 than	 respecting	 her	 evidence,	 when	 she	 acquires	 the	
higher-order	evidence	that	she	is	hypoxic.	
Indeed,	 the	 equivocation	 strategy	 doesn’t	 even	 provide	 us	 with	 the	
conceptual	resources	for	asking	whether	it’s	better	to	respect	evidence	or	maintain	
coherence	in	conflict	cases.	After	all,	we	have	no	single	normative	concept	in	terms	
of	which	 these	 conflicting	 requirements	 can	 be	weighed	 against	 each	 other.	We	
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any	 unified	 virtue	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 that	 requires	 both	 coherence	 and	
respecting	 your	 evidence.	 According	 to	 the	 equivocation	 strategy,	 there	 is	 a	
substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence,	and	a	structural	requirement	to	








The	 previous	 section	 raised	 problems	 for	 bifurcationist	 attempts	 to	 solve	 the	
puzzle,	 whereas	 this	 section	 raises	more	 general	 problems	 for	 the	 bifurcationist	
assumption	 that	 generates	 the	 puzzle	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 I	 argue	 that	 we	 should	
reject	 the	 bifurcationist	 assumption	 that	 your	 evidence	 can	 support	 incoherent	
beliefs.	 Instead,	 we	 should	 prefer	 a	 more	 unified	 conception	 of	 epistemic	
rationality,	 which	 builds	 the	 structural	 requirements	 of	 coherence	 into	 the	
substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence.	We	should	prefer	unificationism	
to	 bifurcationism	 because	 (i)	 it	 is	more	 parsimonious,	 (ii)	 it	 better	 explains	 the	
value	 of	 coherence,	 and	 (iii)	 the	 distinction	 between	 substantive	 and	 structural	




My	 first	 argument	 is	 that	 there	 is	no	 intelligible	distinction	between	 substantive	
and	structural	 requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	We	cannot	ultimately	make	




Can	 we	make	 any	 sense	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 this	 requirement	 is	 purely	 substantive	
rather	 than	 structural?	 The	 requirement	 is	 that	 your	 degree	 of	 belief	 in	 a	
proposition	 should	 be	 proportionate	 with	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 your	 evidence	




supports	 any	 given	proposition	 to	 any	 given	degree.	Hence,	 there	 is	 a	 structural	
dimension	built	into	the	requirement	to	proportion	your	beliefs	to	the	evidence.	
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Why	 is	 it,	 for	 example,	 that	 your	 evidence	never	 supports	 contradictions?	
This	 is	 because	 there	 are	 logical	 constraints	 built	 into	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
evidential	 support	 relation.	Your	evidence	 supports	a	contradiction,	p	 and	not-p,	
only	if	it	supports	both	conjuncts.	But	your	evidence	cannot	support	a	proposition	
while	 also	 supporting	 its	 negation.	 These	 logical	 constraints	 on	 the	 evidential	
support	relation	are	best	captured	within	a	probabilistic	framework,	according	to	
which	your	evidence	supports	a	proposition	only	if	it	is	more	probable	than	not	on	
your	evidence	that	 it	 is	 true.	 It	cannot	be	that	a	proposition	and	its	negation	are	
both	more	probable	 than	not	 to	be	 true,	 since	 the	probability	of	 the	disjunction	
must	sum	to	one.	Hence,	your	evidence	never	supports	contradictory	propositions.	
Now	consider	 the	 requirement	 to	be	coherent.	Can	we	make	any	sense	of	
the	 idea	 that	 this	 requirement	 is	 purely	 structural	 rather	 than	 substantive?	
Coherence	requires	that	your	beliefs	stand	in	certain	relations	to	your	other	beliefs	
and	mental	 states.	This	 requirement	has	 a	 structural	dimension,	which	concerns	
the	 structure	 of	 the	 relations	 that	 must	 hold	 between	 your	 beliefs	 and	 other	
mental	states.	But	it	also	has	a	substantive	dimension,	which	concerns	the	mental	
states	that	fall	within	its	scope.	
Which	mental	 states	 fall	within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 coherence	 requirement?	
The	 most	 plausible	 answer	 is	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	 requires	 your	 beliefs	 to	
cohere	not	 just	with	your	other	beliefs,	but	 also	with	all	 the	other	mental	 states	
that	provide	you	with	evidence.	The	assumption	here	is	not	that	your	evidence	is	
exhausted	by	facts	about	your	mental	states,	but	merely	that	you	possess	evidence	





which	 may	 be	 defeated	 by	 the	 evidence	 provided	 by	 other	 beliefs.	 Plausibly,	
however,	your	experiences	provide	you	with	evidence	as	well	as	your	beliefs.	This	
means	 that	 your	 beliefs	 can	 cohere	with	 each	 other	 without	 cohering	 in	 all	 the	
ways	that	matter	for	epistemic	rationality.	Magic	Feldman	is	a	case	in	point:	he	is	
epistemically	irrational	because	his	beliefs	cohere	with	each	other	but	not	with	his	




mental	 states.	 For	 example,	 it	 is	 not	 epistemically	 irrational	 to	 believe	 a	
proposition	while	 subdoxastically	 representing	 its	 negation	 in	 a	mental	module.	
This	 is	 because	 your	 subdoxastic	mental	 representations,	 unlike	 your	 beliefs,	 do	
not	 provide	 you	 with	 evidence.	 Epistemic	 rationality	 requires	 that	 your	 beliefs	
cohere	with	all	and	only	those	mental	states	that	provide	you	with	evidence.	
How	exactly	should	your	beliefs	cohere	with	the	mental	states	that	provide	
you	 with	 evidence?	 The	 most	 plausible	 answer	 is	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
coherence	 requirement	 derives	 from	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 evidential	 support	
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relation.	Your	beliefs	should	cohere	with	the	mental	states	that	provide	you	with	
evidence	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation.	
Hence,	the	coherence	requirement	for	epistemic	rationality	is	none	other	than	the	
requirement	to	hold	beliefs	that	cohere	with	your	evidence.	
The	upshot	 is	 that	 there	 is	no	 intelligible	distinction	between	 substantive	
and	structural	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	Fundamentally,	 there	 is	 just	
one	requirement	of	epistemic	rationality,	which	incorporates	both	substantive	and	
structural	 dimensions.	 This	 is	 the	 evidentialist	 requirement	 to	 proportion	 your	
beliefs	to	the	evidence	in	the	sense	that	they	cohere	with	substantive	facts	about	






My	 second	 argument	 concerns	 the	 value	 of	 coherence.	 If	 unificationism	 is	 true,	
then	 the	 value	of	 coherence	 consists	 in	 the	 value	of	 respecting	 your	 evidence.	 If	
bifurcationism	is	true,	however,	the	value	of	coherence	is	much	harder	to	explain.	
What	 is	 the	 value	 of	 coherence	 when	 it	 comes	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 respecting	 your	
evidence?	Does	it	have	any	genuine	epistemic	value	or	does	it	merely	reflect	some	
fetish	for	neat	and	tidy	belief	systems?	And	if	coherence	has	no	genuine	epistemic	
value,	 then	 what	 is	 the	 normative	 force	 of	 the	 structural	 requirement	 to	 be	
coherent?	Do	we	have	any	good	reason	to	be	coherent?	
One	answer	is	that	coherence	has	intrinsic	value.	This	has	some	plausibility	
given	 the	unificationist	 view	 that	 the	value	of	 coherence	 consists	 in	 the	value	of	
respecting	 your	 evidence.	 And	 yet	 it	 is	 much	 less	 plausible	 that	 coherence	 has	
intrinsic	value	when	it	results	from	disrespecting	your	evidence.	As	Niko	Kolodny	
writes,	 “It	 seems	 outlandish	 that	 the	 kind	 of	 psychic	 tidiness	 that	 .	 .	 .	 formal	
coherence	enjoins	should	be	set	alongside	such	final	ends	as	pleasure,	friendship,	
and	knowledge”	(2007:	241).	
A	 second	 answer	 is	 that	 coherence	 has	 instrumental	 value	 because	 it	 is	 a	
means	 to	 an	 end	 that	 has	 intrinsic	 value	 –	 namely,	 respecting	 your	 evidence.	
Again,	 this	 claim	 has	 some	 plausibility	 given	 the	 unificationist	 view	 that	 your	
evidence	always	supports	coherent	beliefs,	since	your	beliefs	must	be	coherent	to	
respect	 your	 evidence.	 And	 yet	 it	 is	much	 less	 plausible	 given	 the	 bifurcationist	
view	that	your	evidence	can	support	incoherent	beliefs.	How	is	coherence	a	means	
to	 the	 end	 of	 respecting	 your	 evidence	 in	 such	 cases?	 If	 conflict	 cases	 are	 rare	
enough,	 then	 perhaps	 coherence	 is	 a	 reliable	 though	 not	 infallible	 way	 of	
respecting	your	evidence.	Once	we	divorce	evidence	and	coherence,	however,	it	is	
far	from	clear	that	conflict	cases	will	be	the	exception	rather	than	the	rule.	
A	 third	 answer	 is	 that	 coherence	 has	 instrumental	 value	 because	 it	 is	 a	
necessary	condition	for	agency,	the	capacity	to	act	on	beliefs	and	desires.	If	there	
are	 coherence	 constraints	 built	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 agency,	 then	 perhaps	 we	 can	





One	 problem	 is	 that	 any	 coherence	 constraints	 on	 agency	 must	 be	
extremely	 weak.	 Perfect	 coherence	 cannot	 be	 required	 for	 agency,	 since	 human	
agents	fall	well	short	of	this	demanding	threshold.	At	best,	agency	requires	some	
minimal	degree	of	coherence.	So	what	explains	the	added	value	of	increasing	your	





Enoch	 (2006)	 articulates	 the	 question,	why	 should	we	 care	 about	agency,	 rather	
than	schmagency?	As	I’ll	explain,	this	challenge	is	especially	urgent	for	proponents	
of	bifurcationism	who	build	coherence	constraints	into	the	nature	of	agency.	





an	 ideal	 epistemic	 agent	 whose	 beliefs	 are	 always	 perfectly	 proportioned	 to	 her	
evidence.	Whenever	her	evidence	supports	incoherent	beliefs,	such	an	agent	holds	
incoherent	beliefs	under	conditions	of	 full	 self-knowledge	with	no	disposition	 to	
abandon	 them.	 But	 Worsnip’s	 account	 of	 incoherence	 excludes	 this	 possibility,	
since	it	is	inconsistent	with	the	coherence	constraints	on	the	nature	of	belief.	
This	is	a	surprising	result.	It	is	often	thought	to	be	possible	in	principle,	if	
not	 in	 practice,	 that	 there	 could	 be	 an	 ideal	 epistemic	 agent	 whose	 beliefs	 are	
always	perfectly	proportioned	to	her	evidence.	And	yet	this	possibility	is	excluded	
by	 combining	 Worsnip’s	 bifurcationism	 with	 his	 account	 of	 incoherence.	 More	
importantly,	 anyone	who	bites	 this	bullet	 faces	 an	awkward	normative	question.	
What	is	the	normative	significance	of	the	fact	that	the	constitutive	nature	of	belief	
precludes	incoherence	under	conditions	of	full	self-knowledge?	Is	it	a	good	thing	
because	 it	 provides	 us	with	 some	protection	 against	 incoherence?	Or	 is	 it	 a	 bad	






constraints	 on	 agency	 pose	 an	 obstacle	 to	 substantive	 rationality.	 It	 would	 be	
better	 to	 have	 belief-like	 and	 desire-like	 states	 that	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 these	
coherence	 constraints.	 In	Enoch’s	 terms,	 it	would	be	better	 to	be	 a	 “schmagent”	
with	“schmeliefs”	and	“schmesires”,	rather	than	an	agent	with	beliefs	and	desires.		
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I	 conclude	 that	 proponents	 of	 bifurcationism	 cannot	 derive	 the	 value	 of	
coherence	 from	 the	 value	 of	 agency.	 More	 generally,	 I	 suspect	 that	 we	 cannot	









Hence,	 parsimony	 favors	 this	 view	 by	 an	 application	 of	 Occam’s	 razor:	 don’t	
multiply	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	beyond	necessity!	
This	 argument	 is	 not	 conclusive,	 of	 course,	 since	 Occam’s	 razor	 permits	
multiplying	 requirements	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 when	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 do	 so.	
Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 enough	 to	 impose	an	argumentative	burden	on	proponents	of	
bifurcationism.	Do	we	have	any	good	reason	to	divorce	the	structural	requirement	
of	 coherence	 from	 the	 substantive	 requirement	 to	 respect	 your	 evidence?	 One	














fare	 equally	 poorly	 in	 responding	 to	 the	 evidence.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 is	 an	
intuitive	sense	in	which	Beth	is	doing	epistemically	better	than	Carl,	since	at	least	
her	beliefs	are	coherent.	Bifurcationism	can	explain	this	easily.	Although	they	both	
violate	 the	 substantive	 requirement	 to	 respect	 their	 evidence,	 only	Beth	 satisfies	
the	 structural	 requirement	 to	 have	 coherent	 beliefs.	 The	 challenge	 for	
unificationism	is	to	explain	the	intuitive	sense	that	Beth	does	epistemically	better	








rather	 than	suicide.	Beth	 is	disposed	 to	proportion	her	beliefs	 to	 the	evidence	 in	
the	 easy	 case,	 but	 not	 the	hard	 case,	whereas	Carl	 is	 disposed	 to	 proportion	his	
beliefs	to	the	evidence	in	neither	case.	In	that	sense,	Beth’s	reasoning	dispositions	
are	more	responsive	to	evidence	than	Carl’s.	This	explains	the	intuitive	sense	that	





not	result	 from	evidence-sensitive	dispositions	at	all.	But	now	I	 lose	my	 intuitive	





there	 is	 in	coherence	when	 it	doesn’t	 result	 from	evidence-sensitive	dispositions.	
Otherwise,	there	is	no	need	to	bifurcate	structural	and	substantive	requirements	in	
order	to	explain	the	intuitive	normative	difference	between	subjects	who	differ	in	
coherence	while	 failing	 to	 respect	 their	 evidence.	Of	 course,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	





According	 to	 my	 unificationist	 proposal,	 there	 is	 just	 one	 fundamental	
requirement	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 –	 namely,	 the	 evidentialist	 requirement	 to	




about	 your	 evidence	 together	 with	 structural	 facts	 about	 the	 evidential	 support	
relation.	 Hence,	 the	 evidentialist	 requirement	 incorporates	 both	 structural	 and	
substantive	 dimensions:	 epistemic	 rationality	 requires	 that	 your	 beliefs	 cohere	
with	 substantive	 facts	 about	 your	 evidence	 in	 accordance	 with	 structural	 facts	
about	the	evidential	support	relation.	
How	does	this	version	of	unificationism	solve	our	puzzle	about	the	conflict	
between	evidence	and	evidence?	On	 this	 view,	 there	 can	be	no	conflict	between	
evidence	and	coherence	 (cf.	Kolodny	2007;	Kiesewetter	2017;	Lord	2018).	Anyone	
who	 respects	 their	 evidence	 is	 guaranteed	 to	 be	 coherent,	 since	 there	 are	
coherence	 constraints	 built	 into	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation.	
These	structural	constraints	on	the	evidential	support	relation	guarantee	that	your	






that	 epistemically	 rational	 agents	 are	 logically	 coherent.	 Epistemically	 rational	
agents	 have	 logically	 consistent	 beliefs	 because	 they	 always	 believe	 what	 their	
evidence	 supports	 and	 their	 evidence	 never	 supports	 logically	 inconsistent	
propositions.	 Similarly,	 they	 believe	 all	 the	 logical	 consequences	 of	 their	 beliefs	
because	the	evidential	support	relation	is	closed	under	logical	consequence:	
	










Some	 epistemologists	 take	 lottery	 and	 preface	 paradoxes	 to	 undermine	
logical	 consistency	 and	 closure	 requirements	 on	 epistemic	 rationality.	 However,	
the	 logical	 constraints	 on	 belief	 can	 be	 preserved	 in	 the	 form	 of	 probabilistic	






(3) If	 p	 and	 q	 are	 mutually	 exclusive,	 then	 Pr	 (p	 ∨	 q)	 =	 Pr	 (p)	 +	 Pr	 (q).	
(Christensen	2004:	16)	
	
On	 a	 probabilistic	 conception	 of	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation,	 degrees	 of	
evidential	 support	are	evidential	probabilities.	Epistemically	 rational	 thinkers	are	
probabilistically	coherent	because	the	evidential	support	relation	is	constrained	by	
the	axioms	of	the	probability	calculus.	In	particular,	epistemically	rational	thinkers	




higher-order	 constraints	 on	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation.	 On	 a	 probabilistic	








The	 rationale	 for	higher-order	constraints	 is	 to	explain	why	epistemic	 rationality	
requires	meta-coherence.	 Intuitively,	 epistemically	 rational	 agents	 always	believe	
what	they	believe	they	should	believe.	Just	as	it	seems	irrational	to	act	akratically	
in	 conflict	with	 your	 beliefs	 about	 how	 you	 should	 act,	 so	 it	 seems	 irrational	 to	
believe	akratically	 in	conflict	with	your	beliefs	about	how	you	should	believe.	To	
explain	why	 epistemic	 akrasia	 is	 always	 irrational,	we	 need	 to	 recognize	 higher-
order	 constraints	 as	well	 as	 first-order	 logical	 or	 probabilistic	 constraints	 on	 the	
evidential	 support	 relation.	 Epistemically	 rational	 agents	 are	 meta-coherent	
because	 they	 always	 proportion	 their	 beliefs	 to	 their	 evidence	 and	 they	 always	
know	with	certainty	what	their	own	evidence	supports.	
This	higher-order	constraint	on	the	evidential	support	relation	is	extremely	






should	be	higher	or	 lower.	To	 rule	 this	out,	we	need	 to	maintain	 that	 evidential	
probabilities	are	always	evidentially	certain.	
This	 higher-order	 constraint	 on	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation	 can	 be	
explained	as	a	consequence	of	two	more	basic	assumptions.	First,	necessary	truths	
about	the	evidential	support	relation	have	the	same	epistemic	status	as	necessary	
truths	 about	 logic.	 Just	 as	 logical	 truths	 are	 certain	 given	 any	 possible	 body	 of	
evidence,	 so	 are	 necessary	 truths	 about	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation.	 The	
normalization	 axiom	 assigns	 probability	 1	 to	 all	 necessary	 truths	 that	 hold	
throughout	 the	 epistemic	 space	 over	 which	 evidential	 probabilities	 are	 defined.	
These	epistemic	necessities	 include	necessary	truths	about	the	evidential	support	
relation	as	well	as	necessary	truths	about	logic.	This	yields	an	evidentialist	version	
of	 Titelbaum’s	 fixed-point	 thesis,	 according	 to	 which	 “no	 situation	 rationally	
permits	an	a	priori	false	belief	about	which	overall	states	are	rationally	permitted	
in	which	situations”	(2015:	293).	
Second,	 all	 contingent	 truths	 about	 your	 evidence	 are	 self-evident	 in	 the	
sense	that	they	make	themselves	evident:	
	
The	 Self-Evidence	 of	 Evidence:	 Necessarily,	 if	 your	 evidence	 includes	 (or	
excludes)	 the	 fact	 that	 p,	 then	 it’s	 evidentially	 certain	 that	 your	 evidence	
includes	(or	excludes)	the	fact	that	p.	
	
The	 claim	 that	 all	 evidence	 is	 self-evident	 is	 a	 plausible	 consequence	 of	 a	
phenomenal	 conception	 of	 evidence,	 according	 to	 which	 your	 evidence	 is	
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exhausted	by	phenomenally	 individuated	 facts	 about	 your	 current	mental	 states.	
On	 this	view,	you	have	 the	 same	evidence	as	your	phenomenal	duplicate	who	 is	
deceived	by	an	evil	demon,	since	there	is	no	difference	in	how	things	seem	to	you.	
Assuming	that	skepticism	is	false,	your	evidence	that	it	seems	to	you	that	p	favors	
the	 anti-skeptical	 hypothesis	 that	 p	 over	 the	 skeptical	 hypothesis	 that	 it	merely	
falsely	seems	that	p.	Arguably,	however,	since	your	evidence	is	consistent	with	the	




things	are	 but	 not	 about	 how	 things	 seem.	 This	 is	 because	 your	 evidence	 about	
how	things	seem	is	constituted	by	the	facts	about	how	things	seem,	rather	than	by	
second-order	 seemings	 that	 can	 misrepresent	 those	 phenomenal	 facts.	When	 it	
seems	that	p,	 it	 is	evidentially	certain	that	 it	seems	that	p,	since	your	evidence	is	
inconsistent	 with	 any	 skeptical	 possibility	 in	 which	 things	 seem	 otherwise.	 A	
demon	 can	 induce	 false	 beliefs	 about	 how	 things	 seem,	 but	 he	 cannot	 induce	




With	 these	 two	claims	 in	hand,	we	can	explain	why	your	evidence	always	











In	 sum,	 higher-order	 constraints	 on	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation	 can	 be	
explained	 as	 a	 natural	 consequence	 of	 a	 phenomenal	 conception	 of	 evidence,	




rationality	 requires	 evidential	 omniscience.	 Perfectly	 rational	 agents	 are	 not	 only	
certain	of	all	logical	truths	but	they	are	also	certain	of	all	truths	about	what	their	
evidence	is	and	what	it	supports.	This	requirement	may	seem	unduly	demanding,	
but	 it	 is	 a	 consequence	of	 the	plausible	 thesis	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	 requires	
respecting	 logic	 and	 evidence	while	 remaining	meta-coherent.	 If	 you	 violate	 the	
requirement	of	logical	or	evidential	omniscience,	and	you	integrate	your	reasoning	
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with	 your	 beliefs	 about	 logic	 and	 evidence,	 then	 your	 reasoning	 fails	 to	 respect	
logic	and	evidence.	Your	doubts	about	 logic	and	evidence	“trickle	down”	 in	ways	
that	 lead	you	 to	disrespect	 logic	and	evidence.	These	 requirements	are	not	mere	
scientific	 idealizations	 –	 that	 is,	 false	 predictions	 of	 a	 theory	 that	 can	 be	 safely	
ignored	 for	 practical	 purposes.	 Rather,	 they	 are	 normative	 ideals	 that	 non-ideal	
agents	can	approximate	towards,	although	we	can	never	realize	them	perfectly.	









can	 have	misleading	 higher-order	 evidence	 about	 what	 your	 evidence	 supports.	
For	example,	Miss	Marple’s	expert	testimony	gives	Mabel	misleading	higher-order	










certain.	 Moreover,	 all	 necessary	 truths	 about	 logic	 and	 evidential	 support	 are	






(1) Epistemic	 rationality	 always	 requires	 that	 you	 proportion	 your	 beliefs	 to	
your	evidence.	





As	 I’ll	 explain,	 however,	 this	 argument	 trades	 on	 an	 equivocation	 between	 ideal	




rational	 to	 be	 uncertain	 about	 logic	 or	 evidence.	On	 this	 reading,	 premise	 (1)	 is	
true	 but	 premise	 (2)	 is	 false.	 By	 non-ideal	 standards,	 in	 contrast,	 epistemic	
rationality	 sometimes	 requires	 being	 uncertain	 or	 mistaken	 about	 logic	 and	
evidence.	But	this	is	because	non-ideal	rationality	requires	responding	to	evidence	
about	 your	 cognitive	 limitations	 by	 adopting	 strategies	 that	 diverge	 from	 the	
epistemic	 ideal	 of	 respecting	 your	 evidence.	On	 this	 reading,	 premise	 (2)	 is	 true	
but	premise	 (1)	 is	 false.	The	argument	 is	unsound	because	 there	 is	no	consistent	
interpretation	on	which	both	premises	are	true.	
Here	 is	 a	 simple	 example	 to	 illustrate	 the	 distinction	 between	 ideal	 and	
non-ideal	 standards	 of	 epistemic	 rationality.	 Suppose	 Holmes	 and	 Watson	 are	











in	 their	 response	 to	 their	 evidence,	 there	 is	no	difference	 in	what	 their	 evidence	
supports.	After	all,	they	have	exactly	the	same	evidence.	Moreover,	there	can	be	no	
difference	 in	 what	 this	 shared	 body	 of	 evidence	 supports,	 since	 the	 evidential	
support	relation	applies	to	everyone	in	the	same	impersonal	way.	Hence,	Watson	
should	believe	what	his	evidence	supports	–	namely,	that	the	butler	is	guilty.	
In	 another	 sense,	 however,	Watson	 should	 remain	 agnostic.	 After	 all,	 he	
knows	that	–	unlike	Holmes	–	he	lacks	the	expertise	to	follow	the	evidence	where	
it	leads.	If	he	gets	lucky	in	this	case,	he	is	prone	to	go	awry	elsewhere,	since	he	is	
not	 reliably	 responsive	 to	 the	 facts	 or	 the	 evidence	 in	 hard	 cases.	 So,	 even	 if	 he	
forms	a	true	belief	that	is	supported	by	his	evidence,	he	is	not	reliable	enough	to	
acquire	 knowledge	 or	 justified	 belief.	 Moreover,	 Watson	 has	 enough	 evidence	





These	 two	 answers	 reflect	 the	 distinction	 between	 ideal	 and	 non-ideal	
standards	of	epistemic	rationality.	 Ideal	 standards	of	epistemic	rationality	always	
require	respecting	your	evidence,	whereas	non-ideal	standards	sometimes	require	
responding	 to	 evidence	 about	 your	 cognitive	 limitations	 by	 adopting	 strategies	
that	diverge	from	the	epistemic	ideal.	Our	intuitive	judgments	about	what	people	
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“should”	 believe	 don’t	 always	 track	what	 their	 evidence	 supports,	 since	 they	 are	
often	more	sensitive	to	non-ideal	standards	of	epistemic	rationality.	




is	 guilty.	 The	 evidential	 probability	 of	 a	 hypothesis	 depends	 on	 how	 well	 the	
hypothesis	explains	all	the	evidence.	This	is	an	objective,	a	priori	matter	that	is	not	
affected	 by	 evidence	 about	 your	 own	 capacity	 for	 reasoning.	 The	 evidential	
probability	of	a	hypothesis	isn’t	affected	by	the	realization	that	you’re	too	tired	or	





ideal	 standards	 of	 epistemic	 rationality.	 When	 you	 have	 higher-order	 evidence	
about	 your	 cognitive	 limitations,	 it	 makes	 sense	 to	 adopt	 epistemic	 policies	 to	
manage	them.	For	example,	it	makes	sense	for	Watson	to	remain	agnostic,	rather	
than	forming	an	opinion	about	the	case,	since	he	knows	he	cannot	reliably	follow	
the	 evidence	 where	 it	 leads.	 It	 doesn’t	 follow	 that	 his	 evidence	 supports	
agnosticism.	This	is	simply	the	best	epistemic	policy	for	managing	what	he	knows	
about	his	on	cognitive	limitations.	
We	 can	 make	 this	 proposal	 more	 precise	 by	 locating	 it	 within	 the	
framework	 of	 rule	 consequentialism,	 which	 evaluates	 rules	 by	 their	 expected	
consequences.	We	can	evaluate	 rules	 in	a	way	 that	 is	 sensitive	 to	 the	distinction	
between	 following	a	 rule	and	merely	 trying	 to	 follow	a	rule.	Following	a	rule	 is	a	
kind	of	achievement:	merely	trying	to	the	follow	the	rule	does	not	guarantee	that	
you	 will	 succeed.	 When	 you	 have	 evidence	 that	 you	 might	 fail,	 the	 expected	
consequences	 of	 trying	 to	 follow	 a	 rule	 can	 diverge	 from	 the	 expected	
consequences	 of	 following	 the	 rule.	 In	 such	 cases,	 the	 best	 rule	 to	 follow	 is	 not	
always	the	best	rule	to	try	to	follow	(cf.	Lasonen-Aarnio	2010;	Schoenfield	2015).	
When	 we	 evaluate	 rules	 for	 epistemic	 rationality,	 we’re	 concerned	 solely	
with	their	expected	consequences	for	how	well	you	succeed	in	proportioning	your	
beliefs	to	your	evidence.	From	an	evidentialist	perspective,	the	best	rule	to	follow	






rule,	 since	 this	 is	 the	 best	 rule	 to	 follow.	 By	 non-ideal	 standards,	 however,	
epistemic	 rationality	 sometimes	 requires	 following	 a	 non-evidentialist	 rule	when	
this	is	the	best	rule	to	try	to	follow.	
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Now	 let’s	 apply	 this	 distinction	 to	 our	 example.	 By	 ideal	 standards	 of	
epistemic	rationality,	Watson	should	believe	what	his	evidence	supports	–	namely,	
that	 the	 butler	 is	 guilty	 and	 that	 his	 evidence	 supports	 this	 conclusion.	And	 yet	
Watson	is	a	non-ideal	agent	who	is	always	capable	of	achieving	these	demanding	
epistemic	 standards.	 In	 hard	 cases,	 he	 is	 unable	 to	 follow	 his	 evidence	where	 it	
leads.	 Moreover,	 he	 has	 enough	 higher-order	 evidence	 about	 his	 own	 cognitive	
limitations	to	know	this	about	himself.	So	he	knows	that	it’s	counterproductive	to	
try	to	respect	his	evidence	in	hard	cases,	since	the	expected	consequence	is	that	he	
will	 manifest	 grossly	 irrational	 dispositions.	 It	 makes	 more	 sense	 to	 adopt	 the	
cautious	epistemic	policy	of	remaining	agnostic	in	hard	cases,	although	he	knows	
in	 advance	 that	 this	 strategy	will	 diverge	 from	 the	 epistemic	 ideal.	Nevertheless,	
adopting	this	strategy	is	a	reasonable	response	to	his	higher-order	evidence	about	
his	cognitive	limitations.	
The	 key	 point	 is	 that	 our	 intuitions	 about	 what	 people	 “should”	 believe	
don’t	 always	 track	 what	 their	 evidence	 supports.	 There	 is	 an	 intuitive	 sense	 in	
which	Watson	 should	 remain	 agnostic	 about	 the	 first-order	question	of	whether	
the	butler	 is	guilty	and	 the	higher-order	question	of	what	his	evidence	supports.	
However,	 it	 doesn’t	 follow	 that	 his	 evidence	 supports	 agnosticism	 about	 either	
first-order	or	higher-order	questions.	It’s	easy	to	overlook	this	point	unless	we	pay	




Are	 there	 epistemic	 dilemmas	 in	which	 the	 requirements	 of	 ideal	 and	non-ideal	
rationality	 come	 into	 conflict?	 The	 whole	 point	 of	 distinguishing	 these	
requirements	 is	 that	 they	 can	 diverge,	 since	 ideal	 rationality	 always	 requires	
respecting	 your	 evidence,	 whereas	 non-ideal	 rationality	 sometimes	 requires	
disrespecting	your	evidence.	For	example,	Watson	is	required	by	ideal	standards	to	
believe	what	his	evidence	supports	–	namely,	that	the	butler	is	guilty	–	although	he	
is	 required	 by	 non-ideal	 standards	 to	 remain	 agnostic.	 This	 is	 not	 an	 epistemic	
dilemma	 in	 the	 strict	 sense,	 however,	 since	 there	 is	 no	 univocal	 sense	 in	which	
Watson	ought	and	ought	not	to	believe	this	conclusion.	There’s	one	sense	in	which	
he	 ought	 to	 believe	 it	 and	 another	 sense	 in	 which	 he	 ought	 to	 withhold	 belief.	
There	are	no	epistemic	dilemmas	in	which	you	ought	in	the	same	sense	to	pursue	
logically	incompatible	options.	
This	 bears	 comparison	 with	 Worsnip’s	 (2018a)	 equivocation	 strategy	 for	








rationality	 sometimes	 requires	 violating	 these	 ideals.	 Let	 me	 close	 with	 some	
reasons	for	preferring	this	view.	
First,	 unificationism	 preserves	 the	 attractive	 idea	 that	 there	 is	 a	 unified	
virtue	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 that	 incorporates	 both	 substantive	 and	 structural	
dimensions.	As	we	noted	at	the	outset,	epistemically	rational	thinkers	are	not	only	
coherent	 but	 also	 respect	 their	 evidence.	 On	 the	 unificationist	 view,	 this	 is	 no	
mere	 coincidence,	 since	 respecting	 your	 evidence	 guarantees	 coherence.	 The	
virtue	of	epistemic	rationality	is	to	hold	beliefs	that	cohere	with	substantive	facts	
about	 your	 evidence	 in	 accordance	 with	 structural	 facts	 about	 the	 evidential	
support	 relation.	According	 to	bifurcationism,	 in	 contrast,	 there	 are	 two	distinct	
virtues	 corresponding	 to	 the	 distinction	 between	 substantive	 and	 structural	
requirements,	but	there	is	nothing	that	unifies	them	in	a	single	virtue	of	epistemic	
rationality.	We	might	decide	 to	 call	 someone	 ‘epistemically	 rational’	 only	 if	 they	
satisfy	both	kinds	of	requirements.	But	this	doesn’t	pick	out	any	unified	virtue,	as	
opposed	 to	 a	 gerrymandered	 conjunction	 of	 distinct	 virtues.	 Decomposing	
epistemic	rationality	in	this	way	seems	like	a	theoretical	last	resort.	
Second,	 we	 do	 not	 compromise	 the	 unity	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 by	
drawing	a	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	requirements.	On	the	version	of	
rule	consequentialism	outlined	in	§5,	non-ideal	rationality	is	a	matter	of	adopting	
strategies	 that	 have	 the	 greatest	 expected	 value	when	 evaluated	 by	 standards	 of	
ideal	 rationality.	 Hence,	 non-ideal	 rationality	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 its	
conduciveness	 towards	 ideal	 rationality.	 Ideal	 and	 non-ideal	 requirements	 of	
epistemic	 rationality	ultimately	 flow	 from	the	same	normative	 source.	According	
to	 bifurcationism,	 in	 contrast,	 substantive	 and	 structural	 requirements	 are	 two	
distinct	and	sui	generis	sources	of	normativity.	
Third,	unificationism	is	more	parsimonious.	Every	normative	theory	needs	
some	version	of	 the	 ideal/non-ideal	distinction	to	account	 for	cases	 in	which	the	
expected	 value	 of	 trying	 to	 follow	 its	 requirements	 diverges	 from	 the	 expected	
value	of	successfully	following	them.	In	such	cases,	there	is	an	ideal	sense	in	which	
you	 should	 follow	 its	 requirements,	 but	 there	 is	 a	 non-ideal	 sense	 in	which	 you	
should	do	otherwise	when	this	has	greater	expected	value.	Bifurcationism	doesn’t	
obviate	 the	 need	 for	 this	 distinction:	 if	 we	 divorce	 substantive	 and	 structural	
requirements,	 then	 we	 need	 to	 distinguish	 further	 between	 ideal	 and	 non-ideal	
species	of	each	genus.	Hence,	unificationism	retains	 the	advantage	of	 theoretical	
parsimony.	We	 cannot	 simply	 trade	 the	distinction	between	 ideal	 and	non-ideal	
requirements	for	the	distinction	between	substantive	and	structural	requirements.	
These	distinctions	don’t	do	the	same	kind	of	theoretical	work.	
Fourth,	 unificationism	 explains	 how	 there	 can	 be	 epistemic	 value	 in	
disrespecting	your	evidence.	As	we’ve	seen,	bifurcationism	struggles	to	explain	the	
value	 of	 coherence	 when	 it	 comes	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 respecting	 your	 evidence.	 In	
contrast,	 unificationism	 does	 a	 better	 job	 of	 explaining	 the	 value	 of	 non-ideal	
rationality	when	it	diverges	from	the	epistemic	ideal	of	respecting	your	evidence.	
There	is	value	in	non-ideal	rationality	because	it	maximizes	your	expected	degree	

























Elga,	 Adam.	 2013.	 “The	 Puzzle	 of	 the	 Unmarked	 Clock	 and	 the	 New	 Rational	
Reflection	Principle.”	Philosophical	Studies	164.1:	127-139.	




Huemer,	 Michael.	 2001.	 Skepticism	 and	 the	 Veil	 of	 Perception.	 Rowman	 and	
Littlefield.	
Hughes,	Nick.	2019.	Dilemmic	Epistemology.	Synthese	196.10:	4059-4090.	







Lasonen-Aarnio,	 Maria.	 2020.	 Enkrasia	 or	 Evidentialism?	 Learning	 to	 Love	
Mismatch.	Philosophical	Studies	177:	597-632.	









Schoenfield,	 Miriam.	 2015.	 Bridging	 Rationality	 and	 Accuracy.	 Journal	 of	
Philosophy	112.12:	633-657.	
Schroeder,	Mark.	2008.	Having	Reasons.	Philosophical	Studies.	139:	57-71.	
Smithies,	 Declan.	 2012.	 Moore’s	 Paradox	 and	 the	 Accessibility	 of	 Justification.	
Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	85.2:	273-300.	








Worsnip,	 Alex.	 2018a.	 The	 Conflict	 of	 Evidence	 and	 Coherence.	 Philosophy	 and	
Phenomenological	Research	96.1:	3-44.	
Worsnip,	Alex.	2018b.	What	Is	(In)Coherence?	Oxford	Studies	in	Metaethics	13:	184-
206.	
